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Abstract
Shawcross is superbly equipped to assess the impact of rogue States and terrorist organizations
on global security. He is also well placed to comment on the risks of preemptive invasion for
existing alliances and the future prospects for the international rule of law. An analysis of the ways
in which the international community has “confronted evil,” Shawcross’ brief polemic argues that
U.S. President George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair were right to go to war without
UN clearance, and that the hypocrisy of Jacques Chirac was largely responsible for the collapse of
international consensus over the war. His curious identification with Bush and his neoconservative
allies as the most qualified to implement this humanitarian agenda, however, fails to recognize
essential differences between the leftist case for war and the hard-line justification for regime
change in Iraq.
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INTRODUCTION
In early 2002, as the war in Afghanistan came to an end and
a new interim government took power in Kabul,1 Vice President
Richard Cheney was discussing with President George W. Bush
the next phase in the war on terrorism. 2 Cheney believed that
leaving Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in power at the end of
the Gulf War was a mistake, and now Bush had a chance to make
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cial thanks to my parents and friends for their love and support.
1. See Ka-zai Takes Power in Kabul, BBC NEWS, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/world/south asia (Dec. 22, 2001) (describing inauguration of Hamid Karzai as
Afghanistan's new Prime Minister). On December 22, 2001, in the first peaceful trans-
fer of power in Afghanistan for decades, Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai was ap-
pointed head of the interim power-sharing council as the first step in a process which
should culminate in elections within two-and-a-half years. Id. For a description of the
thirty-member Interim Administration, see http://afghanland.com/history/interim.
html.
2. See Franklin Foer & Spencer Ackerman, The Radical: What Dick Cheney Really
Believes, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 1, 2003, at 17 (describing enormous influence of Vice Pres-
ident Cheney over foreign policy of Bush administration). See also James Russell &
Iliana Bravo, Iraq: Next Phase of the Campaign?, 1(2) STRATEGIC INSIGHTS, available at
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil (Apr. 2, 2002) (delineating consequences of attacking
Iraq as part of second phase of war on terror). First introduced by President Bush in
his 2002 State of the Union address and later referred to as "the Bush Doctrine," U.S.
foreign policy following the war in Afghanistan has been centered around three general
principles: (1) to combat terror wherever it exists using all means at its disposal; (2) to
define bilateral relationships in terms of countries that support the war on terrorism
and those that do not; and (3) to prevent "rogue" Nations from threatening the world
with weapons of mass destruction. Id.
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it right.3 Whether or not Hussein possessed weapons of mass
destruction, and whether or not Iraq could ever be linked to Al
Qaeda's global terrorist network, was of no concern.4 Eager to
atone for the "sins" of his father,5 Bush resolved to wage war
against evil, and Iraq had all at once become "the most impor-
tant battle of our time. '"6 According to Bahram Saleh, Prime
Minister of the Kurdish-controlled zone of northern Iraq, "Iraq
is the nexus where many issues are coming together - Islam
versus democracy, the West versus the axis of evil, Arab national-
ism versus some different types of political culture."7 In his rous-
ing appeal to the United Nations Security Council on February
5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to it as the
"nexus of poisons and terror."8 Whatever the legacy of the war
3. See Foer & Ackerman, supra note 2, at 17 (recounting Cheney's personal plea
for Bush to topple Hussein). Given his loyal service as Defense secretary to the cautious
administration of Bush's father, which valued stability over democracy-building and cri-
sis management over military preemption, Cheney's personal appeal for war against
Iraq was surprising, though perhaps emblematic of the ideological shift of many politi-
cians following September 1Ith. Id. at 17-18.
4. See Bruce Morton, Selling an Iraq-Al Qaeda Connection, CNN.com (Mar. 11, 2003),
at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD (describing how Bush used media to garner public
opinion in support of war against Iraq). The administration's strained effort to link the
terrorist network to Iraq, despite Hussein's repeated denials of any such connections
and bin Laden's denouncement of the Baath party as "infidels," has led to allegations
that Bush cooked the intelligence to justify a war. Id.
5. See Ramesh Ponnuru, Sins of the Father: How '43' Can Avoid the Mistakes of '41;
NAT'L REv., July 9, 2001 (detailing how President Bush can learn from mistakes of fa-
ther's administration). See also WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, ALLIES: THE U.S., BRITAIN, EUROPE,
AND THE WAR IN IRAQ 24-25 (2004) (discussing consequences of Bush's failure to re-
move Saddam Hussein during Gulf War) [hereinafter SHAWCROSS, ALLIES]. Even before
his election to office, President Bush had been making efforts to avoid what he per-
ceived to be the elder Bush's blunders. In the case of Iraq, the latter's 1991 call for the
Shiite majority to rise up against Hussein, coupled with his subsequent failure to pro-
vide them with military support, precipitated a massive slaughter as the insurgents were
crushed with helicopter gunships. Id. Some have more cynically attributed the war to
Bush's desire to "get" Hussein for an alleged assassination attempt on his father during
a visit to Kuwait. See, e.g., Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, Let Us Reject Empire: 12
Reasons to Oppose the War on Iraq, COUNTERPUNCH, available at http://www.counter-
punch.org (Feb. 21, 2003) (listing reasons not to go to war with Iraq).
6. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 232 (discussing potential ramifications of
United States' failure to rebuild Iraq).
7. Neil MacFarquhar, Rising Tide of Islamic Militants See Iraq as Ultimate Battlefield,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003, at Al (describing nature of resistance movement against
U.S.-led occupation of Iraq).
8. See Colin Powell: "Nexus of Poisons and Terror", Salon.com (Feb. 6, 2003), at http:/
/www.salon.com/opinion (containing transcript of Colin Powell's address to UN Secur-
ity Council in which he makes case against Iraq).
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becomes, Iraq may also be a nexus of filial devotion and per-
sonal vengeance.
Much has been written about the growth of Islamic con-
sciousness and its pathological collision with modernity as the
basis for the terrorist threat.9 For those intent on destroying the
foundations of the international community and restoring relig-
ious autocracy to the Middle East, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq
offered an opportunity for fundamentalist commandos and ter-
rorist brigades to provoke the Apocalypse between East and West
in the name of Allah." ° Hence, the pervasive fear that an attack
on Iraq would provoke a Christian-Muslim "clash of civiliza-
tions."11 For those in the Bush administration subscribing to a
more aggressive foreign policy approach, Iraq provided a chance
9. See SRAwcROss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 225 (discussing growth of Muslim con-
sciousness and its role in global conflict). See also Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of
Civilizations?, 72(3) FOREIGN AlT. 22-28 (1993) (characterizing future of global conflict
as monumental collision of rival cultures). Samuel Huntington, who coined the phrase
"the clash of civilizations," argues that military Islamic resurgence is "in large part a
response to modernization and globalization." Id. Historian Bernard Lewis similarly
downplays the differences between specific Muslim/Arab grievances in his contention
that the "roots of Muslim rage" against the West are to be found in the essence of Islam
itself. See Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim rage, ATLANTIC, available at http://www.
theatlantic.com/issues/90sep/rage.htm (Sept. 1990) (detailing origins of Muslim re-
sentment towards West as based on fundamental differences in interaction between
politics and religion). But see NOAH FELDMAN, AITERJIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR IsLAMiIC DEMOCRACY 31 (2003) (pointing out that opposing worldviews in contact
may also interact to produce new, composite "ideas").
10. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 224 (arguing that U.S.-led occupation
of Iraq is justified in light of threat posed by radical Islam). This militant vision of
radical Islam was expressed as early as 1984 by Ayatollah Khomeini, the theocratic ruler
of Iran who supported Islamic terrorist groups targeting Israel and called for Islamic
revolution throughout the region: "War is a blessing for the world and for every
[N] ation. It is Allah himself who commands men to wage war and kill." Id. Ideologues
like Osama bin Laden similarly insist that "all the evils in the Islamic world follow from
the abandonment of the divine heritage of Islam," a trend for which they blame the
West. Id. at 15. See also MacFarquhar, supra note 7 (referring to Mullah Mustapha
Kreikar's proclamation that Iraq war would be culmination of all Muslim efforts since
collapse of Caliphate in early twentieth century).
11. See SHAwcRoss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 173 (detailing international response to
overthrow of Hussein). French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, for instance,
has insisted that France and the Pope's opposition to the war was the only reason the
world managed to avoid a Christian-Muslim "clash of civilizations." Id. See also Domi-
nique de Villepin, Speech before the United Nations Security Council, available at
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr (July 3, 2003) (warning international community to "be-
ware of playing into.., hands of those who want.., clash of civilizations"). See generally
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
ORDER (1998) (arguing that global community should be seen in terms of cultural "civi-
lizations" fated to conflict rather than as collection of independent States).
2004] BOOK REVIEW 2065
to counteract the threat of militant Islam through the equally
militant promotion of Western-style democracy. 12 As appealing
as such absolutist agendas may be, particularly to those frozen in
dogmatic extremity, there is a real danger of conflating religious
fanaticism and political grievances under the catch-all ideology
of Islamic extremism.13 Bush's war against an amorphous and
irrational "axis of evil" provides a case in point: by refusing to
deal with the political disparities and moral ambiguities inherent
in the terrorist threat, the Bush administration has relied on the
same rationale to justify war on the two very different dangers of
repressive tyranny and religious nihilism. 4
One needs only look at the tensions between Europe and
the United States to recognize the polarization engendered by
Bush's foreign policy on Iraq. 5 A Reagan-like politician with a
strong religious bent, George W. Bush has been decried as the
"American idiot"16 who has contributed to "la crgtinisation""7 of
12. See Foer & Ackerman, supra note 2, at 18 (recounting Cheney's unsuccessful
attempts to convince former Bush administration to support Boris Yeltsin's election as
President of Russian Republic). Grounded in the belief that true international security
depends on the expansion of "the community of peaceful democratic [N]ations," the
aggressive promotion of democracy through military power, currently advocated by the
neoconservative movement and many in the Bush administration, initially emerged out
of Richard Cheney's push for regime change in the former Soviet Union under
Gorbachev. Id.
13. See Gary Kamiya, "An End to Evil" by David Frum and Richard Perle, Salon.com
(Jan. 30, 2004), at http://www.salon.com/books/review (criticizing neoconservative
tendency to define terrorism too broadly). See generally MICHAEL MANN, INCOHERENT
EMPIRE (2003) (arguing that attacking national terrorists that do not directly threaten
United States would only create more enemies and mire country in guerrilla wars im-
possible to win). In their expansive war on terror, prominent neocons like David Frum
and Richard Perle have been much criticized for their failure to differentiate between
national and international terrorist groups like Hezbolla and Al Qaeda. Id.
14. See Jonathan Marcus, Iraq's War after the War, BBC NEWS, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3524640.stm (Mar. 19, 2004) (pointing out dis-
tinctly American tendency to conflate Iraq and war on terror). See also Hal Rhodes, Iraq
Fixation: Bush Administration Confused Threats of Terrorism, Saddam, ALBUQUERQUE TRaB.,
available at http://www.abqtrib.com (Mar. 31, 2004) (noting that Bush administration's
conflation of terrorist threat and Iraq invasion has led to widespread confusion among
Americans).
15. See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN
THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2003) (outlining changing relationship between United States
and Europe in post-Cold War world).
16. See, e.g., Suzanne Hansen, Bush Is An Idiot, But He Was Right About Saddam,
Salon.com (Mar. 22, 2003), at http://archive.salon.com/books (interviewing left-wing
political and cultural critic, Paul Berman, on threat of Islamic totalitarianism).
17. See, e.g., Duhamel Olivier, Limplosion presidentielle, LE MONDE, Apr. 20, 2002, at
I (referring to Bush administration's "cretinization" of U.S. foreign policy).
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the United States, 8 and lauded as a "conviction politician"19
driven more by principle than expediency, a "leader and a trans-
formative figure on the American and world stage. '20 Given this
divisiveness, it is astonishing, and somewhat sad, to come across
a book like William Shawcross' Allies.2' A left-wing historian who
made his journalistic reputation lambasting the United States'
war in Cambodia with Sideshow,2 2 and later anatomized the fail-
ures of UN intervention in Deliver Us From Evil, 23 Shawcross now
identifies with the neoconservative hard-liners in an ardent en-
dorsement of American supremacy and the war in Iraq.24
In fact, Shawcross is only one of several prominent figures
to have produced left-wing arguments for military intervention
in Iraq. In late 2002, columnist Christopher Hitchens resigned
his position at The Nation for what he saw as the magazine's dis-
turbing transformation from a "debating ground between liber-
als and radicals" to the "voice and the echo chamber of those
who truly believe that John Ashcroft is a greater menace than
Osama bin Laden."25 The English press has sardonically attrib-
uted Shawcross' rightward conversion to his recent inheritance
and marriage to a "socialite heiress,"26 though this scarcely ex-
18. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 40-41 (defending President Bush
against his European critics).
19. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 46 (attributing unlikely friendship be-
tween Tony Blair and George W. Bush to shared religious faith).
20. See Woody West, Leading America: Bush Country: How Dubya Became A Great Presi-
dent While Driving Liberals Insane, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at A19 (book review).
21. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5.
22. WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, SIDESHOW (1980).
23. WILLIAM SHAwcROSS, DELIVER US FROM EVIL: WARLORDS AND PEACEKEEPERS IN A
WORLD OF ENDLESS CONFLICT (2001) [hereinafter S-AWCROSS, DELIVER Us FROM EVIL].
24. See SHAwcROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 59 (discussing idea of qualified sover-
eignty). Far from dismissive of the radical neoconservative policy recommendations,
Shawcross argues that "some of the neocon arguments about human rights sound close
to mainstream liberal internationalist thought," and subscribes to the theory of revoca-
ble sovereignty embraced by neoconservatives as sufficient justification for unilateral
action. Id. See also DAVID FRUM & RICHARD PERLE, AN END TO EVIL: How TO WIN THE
WAR ON TERROR 120 (2003) (arguing that since national sovereignty is obligation as well
as entitlement, governments that do not protect rights of citizens forfeit rights to sover-
eignty). For a more in-depth discussion of the theme of revocable sovereignty and its
role in the "right of humanitarian intervention," see REP. OF THE INT'L COMMISSION ON
INTERVENTION AND ST. SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESP. TO PROTECT, available at http://www.
dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/report-en.asp (2001).
25. See Christopher Hitchens, Taking Sides, THE NATION, Oct. 14, 2002, at 9 (citing
ideological disagreement over Iraq war as behind decision to quit post at The Nation).
26. See Edward Vulliamy, William the Conqueror, OBSERVER, July 13, 2003 (condemn-
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plains why outspoken liberals like Paul Berman, Andre
Glucksmann, and Bernard Kouchner have adopted similar pro-
war positions.2 7 Others find it more instructive to consider the
possibility that it is not leftists who have strayed from their princi-
ples, but reality itself that has gone astray. James Traub attrib-
utes the leftist case for war to the underlying realization that "a
morally driven foreign policy looks very different after Septem-
ber 11 than it did before," and that the invasion of Iraq is there-
fore the "consummation, rather than the contradiction" of tradi-
tional leftist beliefs. 28 In a world where militant terrorists advo-
cating mass murder on religious grounds view themselves as
"freedom fighters" and radical liberals advocating military action
on idealistic grounds call themselves "neoconservatives," the left-
ist conversion somehow begins to make sense.
29
As a good friend of both Kofi Annan and Sergio Vieira de
Mello, the high-ranking Brazilian diplomat killed in the UN
bombing in Baghdad last August,30 Shawcross is superbly
equipped to assess the impact of rogue States and terrorist orga-
nizations on global security. 1 He is also well placed to comment
on the risks of preemptive invasion for existing alliances and the
ing Shawcross' conversion from role as "poster boy of anti-Vietnamese War Left" to
friend of American hard Right as betrayal of principles).
27. See Bernard Kouchner, La France est dans limpasse, LE MONDE, Mar. 3, 2003,
translated in WATCH: COVERING THE WAR ON TERROR (Mar. 4, 2003), at http://watch.
windsofchange.net/themes_45.htm (criticizing France's opposition to war in Iraq).
Following the allies' failure to find weapons of mass destruction, there has been a ten-
dency among many leftist advocates of the war to focus on the humanitarian conse-
quences of the invasion. In a recent interview, for instance, Kouchner stated that
"[w]ar is a very bad solution. But there is a solution that is worse than very bad: leaving
in place a dictator who massacres his people." Id.
28. SeeJames Traub, The Good War?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2004, at G7 (book review).
For an extended discussion on the revolutionary foreign policy of the Bush administra-
tion even before September l1th, see James Traub, The Bush Years: Ws ' World, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 14, 2001.
29. See Douglas Sanders, Line Dancing in the Oval Office, the Hard Way, GLOBE AND
MAIL, Jan. 17, 2004, at F3 (discussing shifting distinctions between politics of "hard-
liners" and "soft-liners" with respect to U.S. foreign policy).
30. See De Mello: UN. "s Iraq Envoy, CNN.com (Aug. 19, 2003), at http://www.cnn.
com/WORLD (recounting brilliant career and sudden death of Brazilian diplomat
Sergio Vieira de Mello).
31. See Edward Vulliamy, Appointment in Samara, OBSERVER, Dec. 28, 2003, at 14
(book review). William Shawcross made his name with "one of the greatest pieces of
journalism" about the destruction of Cambodia by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger,
and has written extensively about the revolutions that toppled communism in Eastern
Europe. Id. See also William Shawcross, Curriculum Vitae, available at http://www.wil-
liamshawcross.com/curriculum-print.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2004).
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future prospects for the international rule of law.3 2 An analysis
of the ways in which the international community has "con-
fronted evil,"33 Shawcross' brief polemic argues that U.S. Presi-
dent George Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair were
right to go to war without UN clearance, 4 and that the hypocrisy
of Jacques Chirac was largely responsible for the collapse of in-
ternational consensus over the war.3 5 His curious identification
with Bush and his neoconservative allies as the most qualified to
implement this humanitarian agenda, however, fails to recog-
nize essential differences between the leftist case for war and the
hard-line justification for regime change in Iraq.
I. ANTI-AMERICANISM AND THE COLLAPSE OF CONSENSUS
Whether or not one subscribes to the view that Bush cooked
the intelligence to justify a war that many in his cabinet had ad-
vocated for years, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq has, if nothing
else, provoked an impassioned debate over how international re-
lations should be conducted in the post-September 11 th world.3 6
To liberal internationalists, preserving the legal authority and
moral credibility of the United Nations as the principle forum
for ensuring peace and security remains paramount.3 7 The less
32. See Jason Cowley, Once a Model Progressive, He is Now the Royal Choice to Write the
Queen Mother's Life and an Apologist for War in Iraq - Man of the Year: William Shawcross -
Biography, NEW STATESMAN, Dec. 15, 2003 (recounting Shawcross' long-held interest in
impact of U.S. power on global alliances and role of UN as mechanism for spread of
human rights and democracy).
33. See SHAWCROss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 7 (describing effects of global terrorist
threat on international relations and diplomacy following September 1lth).
34. See S-tAWCROss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 217-18 (arguing why war in Iraq was
legal under existing UN framework). Specifically, Shawcross argues that no second Se-
curity Council resolution was required to legally endorse the war because Iraq had al-
ready been in "material breach" of its obligations to disarm under Resolution 678. Id.
35. See SHAWCROss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 97-98 (describing ongoing commercial
relationship between France and Iraq). According to Shawcross, French President Jac-
ques Chirac was looking out for his own economic interests when he attempted to give
Iraq the benefit of the doubt by undermining UN inspection systems and violating UN
trade sanctions. Id.
36. See Re-ordering the World, Economist.com (Mar. 21, 2003), at http://www.econo-
mist.com (discussing future impact of Iraq war on international relations and emer-
gence of new world order). See also Kurt M. Campbell, The End of Alliances? Not so Fast,
27(2) WASH. Q. 151-63 (Spring 2004) (responding to view that transatlantic alliance
only slows U.S. response time to urgent challenges and reduces U.S. freedom of move-
ment in international arena).
37. See SHAwcRoss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 218 (discussing legality of Iraq war and
need for UN to adapt to terrorist threat).
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than stellar record of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Ko-
sovo, Rwanda, and Sierra Leona, however, has exposed funda-
mental flaws in a system intended to ensure collective security
while, at the same time, respecting national sovereignty.3 Long
before September 11, 2001, Secretary-General Kofi Annan
prompted a massive shift in traditional UN doctrine when he
declared that human rights would finally "take precedence over
concerns of [S]tate sovereignty."3 9 Responding to the assertion
of national sovereignty as justification for domestic repression
and recognizing the international security implications of hu-
manitarian crises, Annan had implicitly authorized the greater
use of force in humanitarian intervention.4 °
But because the United Nations, and Annan especially, re-
mains "multilateralist by precedent,"4 the unilateral approach
espoused by the United States continues to challenge the foun-
dations of international law and fracture the transatlantic alli-
ances established under its aegis. 42 An influential group of ad-
38. See Franklin Foer, Turtle Dove: How Kofi Annan Fooled the Bushies, NEW REPUBLIc,
Oct. 14, 2002, at 20 (detailing strained relationship between UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan and United States). The UN's ineptitude was perhaps most glaringly apparent
in its inability to stop the Serb assault on the "safe area" of Srebrenica as Serbs imple-
mented their policy of "ethnic cleansing" on all Bosnian Muslims who had fled similar
assaults in other towns. According to one anonymous official, the UN's inability to
"save the people of Srebrenica from the Serb campaign of mass murder ... [was] in
part rooted in a philosophy of neutrality and nonviolence wholly unsuited to the con-
flict." Id. at 22. Many attribute the UN's failure in Bosnia to its untenable position of
acting as a neutral arbiter in a morally unambiguous situation. Id.
39. See Foer, supra note 38, at 21. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (instructing
"[a]ll Members [to] refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any [S]tate"). Based
on the principle of "sovereign equality," the 1945 UN Charter was more concerned with
promoting the interests of individual States than protecting human rights and individ-
ual liberties. See Alain Pellet, State Sovereignty and the Protection of Fundamental Human
Rights: an International Law Perspective, 1 (1) PUGWASH OCcAsIONAL PAPERS, available at
http://www.pugwash.org (Feb. 2000) (arguing that State sovereignty is not defense
against gross violations of human rights).
40. See SHAWCROss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 59-60 (quoting from two speeches
before General Assembly in summer of 1998 and on September 20, 1999). Annan's
argument for qualified sovereignty is grounded on the idea that the UN Charter was
"not meant as a license for governments to trample on human rights and human dig-
nity" and that "a great number of peoples ... need more than just words of sympathy
from the international community." Id.
41. See Foer, supra note 38, at 20 (quoting from Annan's speech before General
Assembly on September 12, 2002).
42. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Article 51 states that "[n]othing in the present Char-
ter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
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ministrative officials, referred to derisively as the "ideologues of
American Empire,"4" now maintains that global security can be
achieved only by rejecting international treaties and institutions,
embracing the doctrine of preventative war, and eschewing di-
plomacy for unilateralist force whenever core interests are at
stake.4 4 Distrustful of international frameworks and collective se-
curity, neoconservatives ("neocons") 45 like Vice President Che-
ney, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard
Perle, an arms control expert popularly known as the "Prince of
Darkness," dismiss the founding principles of the UN as a tool
for undemocratic Nations to constrain the United States and
view the war in Iraq as an opportunity to assert Pax Americana
under a unipolar world.46
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Id. Meant to
prevent the risk of military intervention based on the self-interested political motives of
powerful Member States, the UN Charter maintains a sharp distinction between unilat-
eral and collective intervention, allowing for the former only in the context of self-
defense. SeeJoseph S. Nye, Jr., Unilateralism v. Multilateralism: America Can't Go it Alone,
INT'L HERALD TPiB., June 13, 2002, at 8 (arguing that U.S. foreign policy should main-
tain general preference for multilateralism).
43. See SH-AWCROSS, ALIES, supra note 5, at 51-52 (discussing origins and evolution
of neoconservative movement). See also Joshua Muravchik, The Neoconservative Cabal,
Am. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL'y RES., available at http://www.aei.org (Sept. 3,
2003) (deconstructing "myth" of neoconservative faction within Bush administration as
misinformed conspiracy theory).
44. See generally FRUM & PERLE, supra note 24 (arguing that militant promotion of
democracy overseas and strengthening of security measures at home are only way to
"win" war on terror). Among the policy recommendations made by neocon hard-liners
include the aggressive push for regime change in Iran, North Korea and Saudi Arabia,
Syria, the total abandonment of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, a new PATRIOT
Act that would revoke the citizenship of Americans found donating money to "terrorist"
organizations, and the threatened withdrawal of U.S. membership from the United Na-
tions unless it amends its Charter to allow for "preemptive self-defense." Id.
45. See Irving Kristol, The Neoconservative Persuasion, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 5, 2003
(discussing origins of neoconservative movement). The term "neocons" derives from a
disdainful reference to former leftist intellectuals who had been disillusioned by the
backlash against McCarthyism in the late 1960s. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at
52. See generally JAMES MANN, RISE OP THE VULCANS: THE HISTORY OF BUSH'S WAR CABI-
NET (2004) (detailing early careers and rise to power of Bush's inner circle and their
dramatic impact on U.S. foreign policy).
46. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 57-59 (discussing radical objectives of
neoconservative movement). Neocons have more euphemistically defined their own
movement as "a robust approach to the foreign scene ... [that] sees no inherent in-
compatibility between American interests and American ideals." See Michelle Goldberg,
Is this the Neocon Century?, Salon.com (Dec. 17, 2003), at http://www.salon.com/opinion
(quoting arbitrator from recent panel discussion on neoconservative movement be-
tween neocon kingpin Richard Perle and liberal journalist Joshua Micah Marshall).
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It is impossible to make sense of either the neocon agenda
or the leftist case for war without considering the history of the
United States' schizophrenic foreign policy in the Middle East.
The "bastard offspring" of nationalism and socialism, the dictato-
rial style of government and indoctrination practiced by Saddam
Hussein's regime has never been in doubt.4 7 Closely following
Joseph Stalin's model of expurgating conspirators, Hussein's
first act as president involved reading out the names of fifty-four
suspected co-conspirators at a meeting of senior party members
and ordering those officials not suspected of treachery to take
part in the firing squads that dispatched the "guilty."48 In 1988,
Hussein ordered at least 5,000 people from the Kurdish town of
Halabja gassed to death for collaborating with Iran.49 Three
years later, he deployed some eighty Republican Guard tanks to
brutally suppress the Shia rebellion in Basra."° It has since been
estimated that Hussein has murdered at least 300,000 of his own
people since 1991.51 For much of his regime, however, the
47. See Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong?, ATtAric MONTHLY, available at http://
www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/01/lewis.htm (Jan. 2002) (exploring underlying rea-
sons behind fall of Muslim civilization). Bernard Lewis cogently argues that the two
dominant ideologies of socialism and nationalism as applied to Muslim Nations have
now both been discredited. For despite their national independence, the majority of
Muslim countries barely survive on primitive infrastructures and indoctrination tech-
niques based on terror and repression. Id.
48. See SHAwcRoss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 19 (arguing that Hussein's willingness
to use weapons of mass destruction against West can be inferred from appalling human
rights violations against own people and neighboring countries). See also Richard
Walker, Saddam's Legacy of Violence and War, MSNBC NEWS, available at http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/3708671 (Dec. 14, 2003) (recounting Hussein's rise to power and
subsequent terrorization of Middle East region).
49. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 21 (describing Hussein's biological
weapons program and Halabja massacre). The use of biological and chemical weapons
against Iran and Kurdish rebels during the Halabja massacre is widely considered to be
the first time since the Holocaust that a government is known to have gassed its own
people. Id.
50. See Who are the Shia?, BBC NEWS, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk (Mar. 3,
2004) (describing history of Iraq's largest ethnic group and its criticism of U.S. plans to
handover power in Iraq).
51. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 160 (recounting how gruesome evi-
dence of human rights violations surfaced in Iraq following collapse of Hussein's re-
gime). As people went searching for lost love ones in mass graves, Iraqis come forward
with tales of personal atrocities, and DVDs of police torture and arbitrary executions
went on sale all over Iraq, the fall of the Baath regime precipitated the discovery of an
overwhelming amount of evidence confirming Hussein's "reign of terror." Id. at 160-
61. See also Jack Kelley, Iraqis Pour Out Tales of Hussein's Torture Chambers, USA TODAY,
Apr. 14, 2003 (describing personal accounts of Hussein's preferred methods of tor-
ture).
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United States has turned a blind eye to these human rights viola-
tions, even providing him with limited intelligence assistance, in
the hopes that he might help curb the even greater danger per-
ceived from Iran.52 Not until Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990
did the United States begin to reappraise the threat.53 Yet UN
Security Council Resolution 678, which authorized the Gulf War,
failed to mandate Hussein's removal.54 Prior to Bush's radical
foreign policy changes, the intent has always been, as the Clin-
ton administration often said, to leave Hussein "in his box"55 in
the hopes that he might be overthrown from within.5 6
This misplaced expectation of Hussein's demise continued
to inform the U.S. policy of containment over the next twelve
years.57 Passed in March 1991, Resolution 687 conditioned its
ceasefire on the internationally supervised disarmament of Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction ("WMD"), and created an inspec-
52. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 20 (recounting Washington's decision
to offer limited intelligence to Hussein in attempt to curb Ayatollah). In 1979 Ayatollah
Khomeini drove from power the Shah of Iran, on whom the United States had relied as
part of its defense of the Middle East oil fields. Id. Like much of U.S. Cold War policy,
the United States' aggressive stance towards Khomeini had more to do with protecting
its own economic interests than with any moral denunciation of human rights abuses.
See What have been the Role and Effects of U.S. Foreign Policies and Actions in the Middle East?,
GLOBAL CONNECTIONS, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/globalconnections/mideast/ques-
tions/uspolicy (last visited Apr. 11, 2004) (arguing that economic interests have long
motivated U.S. intervention in Middle East).
53. See SHAwcROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 22 (describing circumstances surround-
ing UN Security Council's decision to pass Resolution 678, authorizing use of force to
expel Iraq from Kuwait).
54. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg. at 27-28, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
0678 (1990).
55. See Robert Kagan, Saddam's Impending Victory, WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 2, 1998
(comparing Clinton's policy of containment toward Iraq with forced demilitarization of
Germany's Rhineland following World War I).
56. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 23 (outlining chronology of Operation
Desert Storm in early 1991). In the event that Iraq failed to pull out of Kuwait by
January 15, 1991, Resolution 678 enabled Member States "to use all necessary means...
to restore international peace and security" in the region. See S.C. Res. 678 (1990),
supra note 54. But see SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 23 (noting that, despite broad
language of mandate, Resolution 678 authorized nothing more than use of military
force for liberation of Kuwait, not overthrow of Baathist regime).
57. SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 26-38 (describing United Nation's ineffec-
tual attempts to disarm Iraq following Gulf War). Given his history of "playing the
reluctant warrior," some commentators have questioned the sincerity of Colin Powell's
efforts to garner UN support for the war in Iraq. See Charles Krauthammer, Powell's Iraq
Containment Policy Fails, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 14, 2003 (arguing that Powell harbored
ulterior motives to undermine Bush's call for war in favor of his personal preference for
policy of containment).
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tions regime, United Nations Special Commission on Iraq,
("UNSCOM") 58 to enforce its directives. 59 In response to Iraq's
attempts to block UN inspectors in 1997, Resolution 113460
threatened to impose travel restrictions on Iraqi officials, though
the abstention of five Member States served only to strengthen
Hussein's defiance of international law.61 Following Hussein's
use of security forces to crush antigovernment riots on the heels
of a prominent Shiite leader's assassination in 1999, Resolution
128462 subsequently created a new inspections regime ("UN-
MOVIC") 63  and extended the oil-for-food program.64  The
United States learned soon enough, however, that containment
did nothing to put an end to Hussein's cruelty, while effectively
lending bin Laden further justification for his fihad against the
West.
6 5
The eventual failure of the containment policy to disarm
Iraq underscores another of Shawcross' major themes: that the
collapse of consensus over how the international community
58. See UN Special Commission on Iraq ("UNSCOM"), available at http://www.un.
org/Depts/unscom/unscom.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2004) (delineating mandate to
carry out on-site inspections of biological and chemical capabilities in Iraq, supervise
destruction by Iraq of ballistic missiles with range greater than 150 kin, and monitor
compliance with mandate not to use, develop, or acquire such weapons).
59. S.C. Res. 687, UN SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
Resolution 687 was part of a thirty-year struggle by the international community to cre-
ate a network of treaties to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons. See
SHAWCROss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 26-27 (outlining limited effectiveness of UN Special
Commission in disarming Iraq).
60. S.C. Res. 1134, UN SCOR, 52nd Sess., 3826th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1134
(1997).
61. See SHAwcRoSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 30 (describing United Nation's re-
sponse to Hussein's 1997 attempts to block weapons inspectors).
62. S.C. Res. 1284, UN SCOR, 54th Sess., 4084th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1284
(1999).
63. See United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission ("UN-
MOVIC"), available at http://www.unmovic.org (last visited Apr. 11, 2004) (replacing
UNSCOM as organization responsible for eliminating development of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq and enforcing compliance with international obligations as laid out
by UN Security Council).
64. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 29-30 (describing effectiveness of Iraqi
propaganda to foster anti-Americanism within international community). Hussein's
propaganda machine was adept at exploiting the oil-for-food program by disallowing
the distribution of supplies to the Iraqis while convincing many in the international
community that UN sanctions were starving a generation of Iraqi children. Id.
65. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 37 (discussing adverse consequences of
containment for welfare of Iraqi people as well as authority of United Nations). Refer-
ring to the U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia since 1991, bin Laden cited the
'armed Christian soldiers" in the sacred land as the ultimate sacrilege. Id.
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should deal with criminal States is as dangerous to international
peace and security as the terrorist threat itself.66 Containment
proved to be an unsatisfactory compromise between Security
Council Members advocating a more aggressive approach to-
ward Iraq and those - notably China, France, and Russia -
urging the relaxation of sanctions and inspections in the inter-
ests of commercial trade.6 7 France bears the brunt of the book's
denunciation; Shawcross blames French President Jacques
Chirac for deliberately undermining both the war itself and the
subsequent reconstruction efforts in Iraq.6"
As opposed to the British tradition of cultivating a "special
relationship" with the United States following World War II,
France has consistently maintained an antagonistic foreign pol-
icy intended to respond to "le deft Americain" and gain the upper
hand in what it sees as a bitter rivalry between la Francophonie
and les Anglo-Saxons.69 In truth, French antipathy exemplifies a
more widespread European trend towards aggressive anti-Ameri-
canism,7 ° which some critics consider an inevitable reaction to
the United States' global preeminence since the Second World
War.71 As the latest, and perhaps most flagrant, example of
66. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 153 (arguing that international commu-
nity's failure to enforce UN resolutions on Iraq's disarmament would lead to distrust
among allies and disrespect among enemies).
67. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 27-28 (discussing underlying reasons
behind failure of disarmament program under UNSCOM).
68. See StAWCROss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 97(describing how France's commercial
dealings with Iraq threatened to undermine UN Security Council efforts to punish it).
Shawcross describes the French proposal for the immediate handover of power to an
Iraqi provisional government as a "desperately cynical attempt to make sure that the
'Anglo-Saxon' attempt to create a better Iraq was bound to fail." Id. at 209.
69. See SRAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 77-78 (outlining history of French an-
tagonism towards United States following World War II). See also Amir Taheri, Not Nor-
mal, NAT'L REv., Nov. 26, 2002 (examining intellectual laziness underlying French anti-
Americanism and its detrimental impact on international peace and security).
70. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, SUpra note 5, at 181-82 (recounting how reaction of
many Western intellectuals to Iraq war has been informed by "reflexive anti-American-
ism"). It is important to note that anti-Americanism is not limited to Europe; many
Americans now perceive their own country as a greater threat to world peace than Iraq.
Prominent novelist and essayist Gore Vidal, for instance, has dismissed the "Bush-Che-
ney junta," claiming that "there are many bad regimes on earth .. .at the moment I
would put the Bush regime as one of them." Id. For an interesting take on how coun-
tries tend to embrace American culture while decrying its global influence, see Sam
Vaknin, The Roots of Anti-Americanism, at http://samvak.tripod.com/pp112.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2004).
71. See Huntington, supra note 9, at 22 (suggesting that cultural hegemony will
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"America as intruder, ' 72 the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq raised the
level of resentment toward the United States (and Britain by as-
sociation) to an unprecedented pitch. British intellectual Tariq
Ali referred to the "decolonization" of Iraq by the United States
and its "bloodshot British adjutant. ' 73 Playwright Sir David Hare
condemned the United States and Britain for their decision to
"annex" Iraq. 4 Michael Meacher, a former Labor Minister, went
so far as to suggest that September 11 th was part of an American
conspiracy. 75  Pointing out such critics' unwillingness to ac-
knowledge Bush's humanitarian motives, Shawcross responds by
wondering how such a "visceral loathing of America" could so
completely eclipse the salutary consequences of Hussein's de-
feat: thanks to U.S. intervention, twenty-three million Iraqis who
have suffered under a repressive regime for decades now have
hope.76
Shawcross' puzzled bewilderment turns to utter contempt
when he addresses the issue of French anti-Americanism and its
impact on European foreign policy. 77 Arising out of a centuries-
old tradition of condescension and fear, French antipathy for
the United States has become a national pastime offering a "rare
bring United States into direct conflict with major regional powers as each Nation strug-
gles to shape future course of history).
72. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 78 (discussing political and cultural
origins of global resentment towards United States).
73. See Tariq Ali, Re-Colonizing Iraq, NEw LEFT REV., available at http://www.newleft
review.net/NLR25501.shtml (May-June 2003) (arguing that Bush administration has
used September 11 th as excuse for pursuing aggressive imperialist agenda).
74. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 183 (describing critical reaction of
many Western intellectuals and artists to war in Iraq).
75. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 184 (recounting how anti-Americanism
has often been tainted by conspiracy theory). Questioning the United States' conve-
nient failure to avert September 11 th, Michael Meacher argues that the war on terror-
ism "has the hallmarks of a political myth propagated to pave the way for a wholly
different agenda - the U.S. goal of world hegemony." Michael Meacher, This War on
Terrorism is Bogus, GUARDIAN, Sept. 6, 2003, at 21 (arguing that U.S. war on terror is
pretext for Bush administration's imperialistic aspirations).
76. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 185-86 (referring to prominent intellec-
tuals and public figures who have supported war in Iraq).
77. See Ever Awkward, Sometimes Risky, ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 2003 (arguing that
France's apprehension with respect to concept of American "hyperpower" has made it
awkward member of Western alliance). Despite France and Germany's outspoken op-
position to the war, however, it is important to remember that Europe as a whole re-
mains essentially divided on the Iraq issue. See European Foreign Policy on Iraq, Cosmopo-
lis (Mar. 2003), at http://www.cosmopolis.ch/english/cosmo34/european foreign-
policy-iraq.htm (examining history of European foreign policy on Iraq).
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terrain ... where conflicting political and intellectual forces can
find common ground. '78 As Shawcross is quick to point out,
however, it is also a pathological delusion and a disingenuous
consolation for the European failure to cope with international
conflict.79 According to Shawcross, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, °
in purporting to "mark a new stage in the process of European
integration," merely created "a new bureaucracy and new
pretensions."8 " Far from being the self-proclaimed "moral con-
science of the world," France's failure to take action against the
genocidal extremists in Rwanda, Shawcross attributes to the
chummy relationship between Hutu President Habyarimana and
former French President Francois Mitterand. 2 For all its af-
fected grandeur, Shawcross reminds the Franco-German alliance
that neither Nation has enjoyed a military victory since 1870.83
78. John Vinocur, Why France Disdains America: Two New Books Scrutinize a Tradi-
tional Gallic Obsession, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 9, 2002, at I (book review). For a fresh
look at the underlying causes of anti-Americanism in France, see generally JEAN-FRAN-
cois REVEL, L'OBs9sSION ANTI-AMERICAINE (2003).
79. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 79-87 (recounting collective failure of
European organizations to deal with collapse of Yugoslavia and Balkan conflicts).
80. Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, O.J.
C 325/33 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 79, incorporating changes made by EC Treaty of Nice amend-
ing the EC Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Commu-
nities and certain related acts, Feb. 26, 2001, OJ. C 80/1 (2001) (amending EC Treaty
on European Union ("TEU"), EC Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC
Treaty"), EC Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC EC
Treaty"), and EC Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community
("Euratom EC Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and Consolidated EC Treaty).
81. See SHAwcRoss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 79 (arguing that founding of European
Union has done nothing to create European superpower comparable to United States).
82. See id. at 80 (describing France's cynical role in Rwanda massacre). Shawcross
makes a similar argument with regard to "Hussein's closest foreign friend," Jacques
Chirac, whose staunch support of Iraq in the Security Council is ascribed to its position
as one of Iraq's largest trading partners. Id. at 97. Others have argued that French
hypocrisy should preclude the UN from overseeing the reconstruction effort alto-
gether: since the French resistance to the disarmament of Iraq was largely motivated by
commercial advantage, it should not now be allowed to reap the financial benefits of
participating in the rebuilding of Iraq. See William Rees-Mogg, French Duplicity Rules UN
out of Rebuilding Iraq, TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 7, 2003, at 16 (arguing that UN should not
be in charge of reconstruction efforts in Iraq). See also William Shawcross, Chirac's Cyni-
cal and Self-Serving Friendship with Saddam Means France must Play No Part in Rebuilding
Iraq, MAIL ON SUNDAY, Apr. 6, 2003, at 24 (contending that France should not be re-
warded for "sweetheart deals" it made with Hussein).
83. See S-AwcROss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 86-87 (quoting Chilean historian and
economist Claudio Veliz to point out paradox of Franco-German leadership in Eu-
rope). Although France and Germany may have "the nicest military uniforms, the shin-
iest boots, [and] the best martial music parades.., they are also encumbered with the
least impressive record in military matters." Id.
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Drawing heavily from the work of foreign policy analyst Rob-
ert Kagan, Shawcross further argues that Europe's growing col-
lectivist outlook, premised on an unwavering belief in the sover-
eign equality of all Nations, is at heart, a feeble attempt to ration-
alize individual States' inferiority complex in the face of
American supremacy.8 4 Empires have always been targeted by
the disgruntled, the disenfranchised, and the dispossessed, who
struggle to find ways to assert distinct social and political identi-
ties."5 Shawcross maintains that since no single European power
can approach the United States in terms of economic or military
strength, attempts to "pool sovereignty" like the Franco-German
alliance and the European Union are actually meant to create an
alternative, or "counterweight," to the world's only super-
power."6 Still, for all the growing enthusiasm over the emer-
gence of a "United States of Europe" as an integrated and formi-
dable political entity, Shawcross points out that it was the United
States, and not NATO, 7 that put a stop to the Balkan massacres
after 200,000 people had perished under Europe's care;88 and it
was the United States, and not the European Union, that liber-
ated Afghanistan from the Taliban regime. 9
84. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 89 (claiming that Europe's growing
emphasis on international law is response to failure to match power of United States).
According to Robert Kagan, Europe is "moving beyond power into a self-contained
world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation," while the
United States continues to "exercise power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where
international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security ... depend[s] on
the possession and use of military might." Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, 113 POL'Y
REv., available at http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html (June 2002) (attrib-
uting current transatlantic tensions to divergent perspectives of United States and Eu-
rope with respect to "morality of power").
85. See, e.g., Richard K. Moore, America and the New World Order, NEW DAWN, availa-
ble at http://cybejourmal.org/cj/rkm (Feb. 4, 1997) (arguing that globalization is form
of political regression threatening democratic institutions and individual freedom).
86. See SHAwcRoss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 87 (discussing complex political mo-
tives behind formation of European Union).
87. North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO").
88. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 85 (discussing tensions in alliance dur-
ing NATO campaign in Kosovo). Shawcross' argument here is somewhat misleading:
in fact, the bulk of the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia had been conducted solely
under NATO's authority, although President Clinton had deployed 2,500 troops to the
region eleven days before the peace treaty was signed on December 14, 1995. See With
Independence Came War: Recent Events in the Balkans, CNN.com, available at http://www.
cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/time/time6.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2004) (containing
timeline of Balkan conflict).
89. See SHAWCROss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 85 (noting that 200,000 people died in
Balkans before United States' intervention). But see George Kenney, The Bosnia Calcula-
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II. THE UNILATERAL SOLUTION
Shawcross undoubtedly agrees with Tony Blair's declara-
tion, in a July 2003 speech before Congress, that the notion of
Europe competing with the United States is both "dangerous"
and an "anachronism. '"90 Nonetheless, it is difficult to reconcile
Shawcross' staunch support of the United Nations, that pre-emi-
nent of all international organizations, with his faith in Ameri-
can supremacy as essential to the security of the world.91 Shaw-
cross' allegiances seem genuinely torn between a deep-rooted
faith in multilateralism, shared by most liberal internationalists,
and a growing support of preemptive unilateralism based on the
Manichaean evildoers-respond-only-to-force worldview. In De-
liver Us from Evil, he dismissed the "idealized belief' that the
United Nations is an independent and objective body of sover-
eign States designed to bring peace and economic development
to the world.92 He seems equally reticent, however, to fully
adopt the neoconservative position that multilateralism is merely
a "synonym for an ineffective and unfocused policy involving in-
ternationalism of the lowest common denominator. " "
The familiar critique that the United Nations has never
been more than a political instrument of the United States94 is
lion, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 23, 1995 (arguing that number of fatalities in Bosnian
war was actually between 25,000 and 60,000).
90. SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 222 (arguing that despite opposition of
France and Germany, most European governments supported the war). Blair fervently
expressed his support of the U.S.-British alliance as follows: "If Europe and America are
together, the rest will work with us. If we split . . .nothing but mischief will be the
result." See Tony Blair's Speech to the U.S. Congress, GUARDIAN, available at http://www.
guardian.co.uk (July 18, 2003).
91. See Peter W. Rodman, Multilateralism and its Discontents, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD
1998-99, available at http://freedomhouse.org/survey99/essays/rodman.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 15, 2004) (describing tension between U.S. commitment to multilateralism
and increasing tendency to unilaterally shape world events).
92. See SHAWCROSS, DELIVER Us FROM EVIL, supra note 23.
93. Gerard Henderson, World Parliament a Pipedream, SYDNEY INST., at http://www.
thesydneyinstitute.com.au/150703.htm (July 15, 2003) (quoting Australian Foreign
Minister Alexander Downer's address to National Press Club on June 26, 2003). David
Fnm and Richard Perle go so far as to argue that multilateral agreements actually
encourage nuclear proliferation. See FRUM & PERLE, supra note 24, at 108-09 (arguing
that Iran's formal adherence to Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has impeded Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency's ability to curtail Iran's nuclear aspirations).
94. See, e.g., N. Korea: UN a 'Tool of U.S.', CNN.com (Nov. 5, 2003), at http://
edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD (discussing North Korea's opposition to resolution
with International Atomic Energy Agency aimed at safeguarding country's nuclear ma-
terial).
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true to the extent that the UN Security Council can only act
when it suits the interests of its five permanent Members, one of
which is the United States.9" But as France's public and unequiv-
ocal opposition to the war in Iraq demonstrates, the United
States has also been forced to grapple with the ideological and
political divisions among its veto-wielding neighbors as well as
the obstinate neutrality of the UN Secretary-General himself.96
For in spite of Powell's pet phrase, "My man Kofi," Annan has
never acted as if he were just another member of the Bush Cabi-
net in his firm adherence to a constructionist interpretation of
Security Council resolutions. 7 That the Bush administration
tried so hard to fit its case against Hussein into the UN frame-
work governing the use of force runs counter to the proposition
that the United Nations is simply a front for American unilateral-
ism.98
A brief overview of the legal justifications for military inter-
vention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter might be instruc-
tive here.99 Although Article 2(4) prohibits any Nation from us-
95. See The United Nations: A Force for Peace?, 9 SOCIALIST REV. AOTEAROA N.Z., avail-
able at http://www.iso.org.nz/sr/9/un.htm (Summer 2001-02) (arguing that UN pro-
vides humanitarian cover for imperialist aspirations of United States). According to
John Bolton, a former Bush Senior Undersecretary of State, "[there is no United Na-
tions... [t] here is an international community that occasionally can be led by the only
real power left in the world, and that is the United States, when it suits our interests,
and when we can get others to go along." Id.
96. See Foer, supra note 38, at 20 (discussing love-hate relationship between UN
Secretary-General and Bush administration).
97. See id. Although Annan is generally regarded as one the greatest secretary-
generals in United Nations history for his efforts to reform the UN's vast bureaucracy
and his innovative approach to the doctrine of State sovereignty, he has been much
criticized for his failure to take a more aggressive stance towards rogue Nations that
continually flout UN authority: "[u]nfortunately, Annan reverts to conventional UN
secretary-general behavior at the worst possible moments. In the face of genocide and
dictators, he loses his nerve." Id.
98. See Rachel S. Taylor, The United Nations, International Law, and the War in Iraq,
WORLD PRESS REv., available at http://www.worldpress.org/specials/iraq (last visited
Apr. 10, 2004) (assessing merits of legal arguments proffered by Bush administration in
case against Iraq). In addition to the infamous argument concerning the risk Hussein's
weapons of mass destruction posed to the United States, Powell also contended that
Iraq had to answer for its numerous violations of Security Council resolutions, so as to
prevent placing the United Nations "in danger of irrelevance." Id. Blair relied more
heavily on Powell's second argument, while Bush tended to emphasize the link between
Hussein's corrupt regime and the global terrorist network. See SHAWCROss, ALLIES,
supra note 5, at 186-87 (describing backlash against Tony Blair following failure to find
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq).
99. See U.N. CHARTER, chap. VII. Entitled "Action with Respect to Threats to the
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ing force against another, °° the Charter permits two exceptions
to this institutional respect for territorial integrity: when force is
necessary to maintain "international peace and security,"' ' and
when force is required in self-defense against an "armed at-
tack."'1 2 The latter represents the sole provision enabling the
use of unilateral force,'"S though its mandate has gradually been
extended to include situations where an armed attack is "immi-
nent."1 °4 In a 1962 legal opinion on the options facing Washing-
ton during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Kennedy Justice Depart-
ment noted that the UN Charter does not "prohibit the taking of
unilateral preventive action in self-defense prior to the occur-
rence of an armed attack."10 5 Shawcross cites the eminent Brit-
ish barrister Christopher Greenwood when he asserts that the
increasing severity of the modern terrorist threat demands a cor-
responding expansion of the traditional scope of "imminent
danger," as first defined by Daniel Webster in the Caroline
case. 
1 0 6
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," Chapter VII of the Charter vests
in the Security Council the authority to address threats to international peace and se-
curity through legally binding coercive measures. Id.
100. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
101. See U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 1. Article 43(1) mandates that "[a]ll Mem-
bers of the United Nations... undertake to make available to the Security Council ...
armed forces, assistance, and facilities . . . necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security." Id.
102. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
103. See The RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE IN THE UN CHARTER ART. 51, at 10 (2002),
available at http://www-hotel.uu.se/juri/sii/pdf/Examensarbete.pdf (last visited Apr.
10, 2004) (describing role of Article 51 in use of unilateral force under Charter). The
sole exception to the multilateralist approach underscoring the rest of the Charter,
Article 51 is based on the belief that "[t]he survival of [S]tates is not a matter of law:"
since the preservation of the State has precedence over positive law, each State must
decide for itself how to mount a defense. Id. (quoting former Secretary of State Dean
Acheson).
104. See Taylor, supra note 98 (summarizing traditional arguments for pre-emptive
self-defense under Charter).
105. See David Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Leashing the Dogs of War, NAT'L INT., Fall
2003, at 58 (discussing divergent approaches of Europe and United States with respect
to when it is permissible to launch armed attacks, how warfare must be waged, and how
relevant legal norms should be enforced).
106. See SHAWCROss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 115-16 (arguing that policy of "antici-
patory self-defense" is justified by gravity of modern terrorist threat). Originating from
an 1837 incident in which British troops attacked the ship Caroline, used by U.S. citi-
zens to take supplies to Canadian rebels fighting British rule, the definition of "immi-
nent" in the context of self-defense traditionally referred to any need for action that is
"instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for delibera-
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Still, it is difficult to see how the doctrine of preemptive self-
defense, as advocated by the Bush administration in his National
Security Strategy (the "Bush doctrine")1 07 fits within even an ex-
panded version of the UN framework. Unilateralism is anath-
ema to the underlying principles of the Charter, and Article 51
grants the right of self-defense only "until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security."' 8 This suggests that the use of force would not be
justified so long as there is time for deliberation before the Se-
curity Council.10 9 With Iraq, the Security Council has had more
than twelve years to come up with ways to contend with Saddam
Hussein. 1 ° As Shawcross himself concedes, there has been no
evidence that Iraq poses an "immediate" threat to global secur-
ity, although there is "irrefutable evidence" that his intent to de-
velop WMD technology constitutes an "inevitable" threat."'
Shawcross also subscribes to the administration's argument
that Iraq's non-compliance with the disarmament provisions of
Resolution 678,112 687,113 and most recently, Resolution 1441,114
tion." See Taylor, supra note 98 (discussing meaning of "imminence" with respect to
Article 51).
107. See The White House, The Nat'l Security Strategy of the United States of
America, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (2002) (providing
blueprint of Bush administration's strategies for conducting war on terror and promot-
ing global democracy).
108. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
109. See Taylor, supra note 98 (summarizing arguments for why war in Iraq is ille-
gal).
110. See George W. Bush, President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48
Hours, Address to the Nation (Mar. 17, 2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html (introducing ultimatum for immediate disarma-
ment of Iraq following twelve years of ineffective diplomatic efforts). Resolution 678,
the first of several international mandates calling for the disarmament of Iraq, was
passed in 1990, more than twelve years before the U.S.-led invasion. See S.C. Res. 678
(1990), supra note 54.
111. See SHAWCROss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 192 (relating how UN inspector David
Kay uncovered evidence indicating Hussein's intentions to acquire weapons of mass
destruction as soon as restrictions were removed). Although his administration failed
to take action, President Clinton presented a similar argument for preemptive self-de-
fense: "If we fail to respond today, Saddam, and all those who would follow in his
footsteps, will be emboldened tomorrow by the knowledge that they can act with impu-
nity, even in the face of a clear message from the United Nations Security Council." Id.
at 215.
112. S.C. Res. 678 (1990), supra note 54.
113. S.C. Res. 687 (1991), supra note 59.
114. S.C. Res. 1441, UN SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1441
(2002).
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has already provided Member States with the requisite legal au-
thority to use "all necessary means" against Iraq, despite the Se-
curity Council's failure to pass a second resolution.' 15 Anxious
to abide by the letter of the law, British Prime Minister Tony
Blair favored seeking just such a resolution in order to defini-
tively ensure the legality of the war.116 Blair's insistence was not
without merit. According to most Members of the Security
Council, only the Council itself - and not individual Members
- has the authority to determine how to deal with violations of
the body's resolutions, a line of reasoning corroborated by the
text of Resolution 687 itself: "The Security Council... [d] ecides
to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as
may be required." 1 7 Although Resolution 1441 was passed by a
vote of 15-0 on November 8, 2002,18 the deliberate ambiguity of
its phrasing was meant to appease the reservations of more reti-
cent Council Members like France, which insisted that any re-
sponse to Iraqi noncompliance be worked out in a second reso-
lution." 9
Shawcross' account of the frantic five-week search for the
nine Member votes needed to pass this second resolution exem-
plifies the continued vitality of the United Nations as a truly
democratic institution, as well as the centrality of the Security
Council as the world's most important forum for public de-
115. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 218 (reiterating legal bases for war
against Iraq).
116. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 116 (describing efficacy of second UN
Security Council resolution authorizing war against Iraq).
117. S.C. Res. 687 (1991), supra note 59. The issue of who decides how to inter-
pret UN Resolutions was raised earlier in 1998 as U.S. and British war planes launched
air strikes against Iraq for continuing to impede the work of UNSCOM in violation of
Resolution 687. See Taylor, supra note 98 (describing argument that decision to use "all
necessary means," as authorized by Chapter VII, should be left to Security Council, and
not to individual States). When the Security Council met on December 16, 1998 to
discuss whether individual Member States could resort to force without renewed Secur-
ity Council consent, not all Members of the Council agreed on the legality of the air
strikes. Id.
118. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 118 (describing UN Security Council's
unanimous passage of Resolution 1441). Given expectations that Syria would abstain
and serious doubts expressed by Russia earlier in the day, the 15-0 vote came as some-
what of a surprise. See Terence Neilan, "Serious" Action Vowed if Inspectors are Barred,
INr'L HERALD TRIB., available at http://www.iht.com/articles/76439.html (Nov. 9,
2002) (describing circumstances surrounding passage of Resolution 1441).
119. See Taylor, supra note 98 (discussing significance of UN Resolution 1441 in
authorizing war in Iraq).
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bate. 12' As Syria insisted on the need to protect the "dignity" of
Iraq and the French and Americans quarreled over the shifting
connotations of a "material breach,"'' 21 the United States evinced
a genuine attempt to exploit the multilateral channels of inter-
national law. 122 That it eventually failed to secure the necessary
votes is largely due to French PresidentJacque Chirac's attempt
to derail Anglo-British diplomatic efforts before the Council. 23
Echoing the view that "Chirac would now have the blood of
American and British soldiers on his hands," Shawcross argues
that France's decision to veto the second Security Council reso-
lution actually precipitated the war by ensuring that there would
never be enough pressure on Hussein to disarm voluntarily. 24
Only briefly touching on Bush's mistreatment of Blair, Shaw-
cross openly condemns Chirac for single-handedly undermining
the international rule of law and endangering global security. 125
This is a fresh perspective, one untainted by the reflexive
anti-Americanism that seems to have informed so many Western
120. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 118 (applauding unanimous passage
of Resolution 1441).
121. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 117 (describing heated discussions
and political posturing of Security Council Members prior to passage of Resolution
1441). Concerned that the draft resolution would make war inevitable by setting the
threshold requirement for "material breach" too low, the French were determined not
to allow the United States to incorporate "hidden triggers" for military action into the
text. Id. See also Jean-Paul Chagnollaud, Letter from France, GLOBAL POL'Y F., available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org (Oct. 28, 2002) (attributing France and Germany's deci-
sion to remove references to "material breach" and "serious consequences" from text of
Resolution 1441 to concerns that such phrases might be used as "hidden triggers" for
U.S. military action).
122. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 118 (lauding unanimous passage of
Resolution 1441 as tribute to skills of UN diplomats and important success for United
States and Britain). See also USUN Press Release, Explanation of Vote by Ambassador
John D. Negroponte, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
on Resolution 1511 addressing the Situation in Iraq, available at http://usinfo.state.
gov/topical/pol/usandun/03101607.htm (Oct. 16, 2003) (declaring that U.S. govern-
ment's careful consideration of proposed resolution reflects commitment to multilat-
eral approach on Iraq).
123. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 148 (recounting France's explicit in-
tentions to veto second resolution endorsing war in Iraq).
124. See id. supra note 5, at 149 (describing Tony Blair's criticism of France's deci-
sion to veto second resolution).
125. See id. supra note 5, at 148-49 (condemning Chirac for opposing second reso-
lution on war in Iraq). See also William Shawcross, After Iraq: America and Europe,
Harkness Lecture 14 (Mar. 27, 2003), available at http://www.cps.org.uk/shawcross.pdf
(last visited Apr. 10, 2004) (stating that despite Washington's "mistakes," France and
Germany are mostly to blame for collapse of consensus surrounding war in Iraq).
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intellectuals' reaction to the war. 126 For much of the interna-
tional media and the vast majority of anti-war protesters, Bush
has been universally vilified as the second biggest villain of the
affair. 127 Even liberals willing to consider the removal of Hus-
sein as the next logical step in the "war against terror" do not
hesitate to condemn Bush for having bungled the diplomacy
necessary to assemble a cohesive coalition. 128 The United States
and Britain's decision to go to war without clear-cut UN author-
ity brought with it the usual accusations of political hypocrisy
and reckless impudence, although many failed to realize that
this was not the first time in recent years that distinct segments
of the international community decided to take matters into
their own hands. 12' Following unsuccessful efforts to achieve a
negotiated settlement between the Yugoslav government and the
separatist Kosovo Liberation Army in early 1999, NATO organ-
ized an aerial bombardment of Serb targets despite the failure to
secure a Security Council resolution in advance.13 ° NATO's im-
pulsiveness was given post hoc legitimacy, however, as the Council
subsequently defeated, by a vote of 12-3, a proposed resolution
by Russia and China to demand an immediate end to the air
strikes.1
31
Whether or not one subscribes to the doctrine of "collective
intervention,"132 Shawcross' account of the legal ramifications of
126. See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text (discussing Western intellectu-
als' acerbic criticism of Iraq war).
127. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 150 (outlining most common criti-
cisms of war in Iraq). While some have insisted that the Bush administration harbored
imperialist intentions toward the oil-rich region of the Middle East, others have con-
demned it as hypocrisy to depose Hussein when there are other regimes that are
equally corrupt. Id.
128. See Goldberg, supra note 46 (arguing that more deliberate approach to Hus-
sein would have garnered more international support for war, as well as more money
and troops for Iraq's reconstruction).
129. See Johann Hari, The Wrong War for the Right Reasons, INDEP. ON SUNDAY, Oct.
26, 2003, at 17 (describing how Kosovo war shaped Tony Blair's aggressive foreign pol-
icy prior to September l1th).
130. See generally GEN. WESLEY CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR: BOSNIA, Kosovo, AND
THE FUTURE OF COMBAT (2002) [hereinafter WAGING MODERN WAR] (recounting Clark's
experience leading NATO to victory in Kosovo, and explaining complexities of fighting
against unconventional forces and coordinating U.S. objectives with those of other Na-
tions).
131. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 147 (arguing that Security Council's
decision to grant NATO action in Yugoslavia post hoc legitimacy is indicative of its falli-
bility with respect to authorizing humanitarian intervention).
132. See Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention" 93 Am. J.
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the U.S.-led invasion provides useful insight into the complex
nature of legality within the context of multilateral military inter-
vention. 133 Somewhat less helpful is his discussion of whether
Hussein actually possessed the great WMD arsenal that justified
the Bush administration's war against Iraq.114 The Coalition's
inability to find incriminating evidence of Hussein's armory fol-
lowing the war was initially ascribed to the proverbial haystack
problem - part of Hussein's organized strategy of deception. 135
It was common practice for the regime to hide chemical shells
among the sprawling collection of conventional weapons he had
amassed since his rise to power in 1979.136 It soon became clear,
however, that there was no such evidence to be found,1 37 at
which point critics of the war instantly protested and proponents
of the war had to come up with an alternative defense. 138 Once
the WMD theory had turned out to be problematic, apologists
for the war adopted the counter-intuitive position that the
dearth of evidence uncovered since the fall of the regime actu-
ally constituted definitive proof of Hussein's guilt.3 9 Shawcross
INT'L L. 824-28 (1999) (suggesting that NATO bombing has set legal precedent for
intermediate category of humanitarian intervention, in which organized group of Na-
tions takes action with tacit acquiescence, as opposed to explicit authorization, of UN
Security Council). See also WAGING MODERN WAR, supra note 130.
133. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 112 (stating that "[a] dozen lawyers
with different opinions can, it goes without saying, dance on ... head of.. . pin").
134. See id. at 186-93 (arguing that subsequent failure to find weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq does not rule out underlying legitimacy of war).
135. See id. at 191 (attributing difficulty of search for weapons of mass destruction
to Hussein's effective strategy of deception).
136. See id. (pointing out that Hussein had amassed about 600,000 tons of shells,
rockets, and bombs).
137. See Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities
of the Iraq Survey Group ("ISQ) before the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence [hereinafter Kay Interim Report], availa-
ble at http://www.cia.gov/cia/public.affairs/speeches (Oct. 2, 2003) (outlining pro-
gress of Iraq Survey Group's investigation into Hussein's weapons of mass destruction
programs). See generally HANs BLIX, DISARMING IRAQ (2004) (providing insider's ac-
count of diplomatic and inspection efforts leading up to war in Iraq and arguing that
U.S.-led invasion was counterproductive to long-term aim of disarmament).
138. See, e.g., Kate Norland, A Liberal Defense of the War in Iraq, CHI. MAROON, availa-
ble at http://maroon.uchicago.edu/viewpoints (Jan. 16, 2004) (arguing that Hussein's
willingness to endure sanctions and evade inspectors constitutes sufficient evidence that
he possessed weapons of mass destruction prior to war).
139. See Bryan Robinson, The Smoking Gun's Charred Trail, ABCnews.com (Apr. 16,
2003), at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world (referring to critics' contentions that
Bush's focus on Iraqi government documents, many of which had been destroyed by
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himself falls into this trap when he mentions that although the
Interim Report by U.S. weapons inspector David Kay discovered
nothing concrete, it had shed light on the elaborate efforts to
which Hussein had gone to destroy evidence and disrupt the in-
spection process. 0
Another typical response to allegations of fraud has been to
highlight Hussein's criminal intent to acquire WMDs in the fu-
ture. a41 According to Rolf Ekeus, the Swedish diplomat who had
been appointed the first head of UNSCOM, although "the Iraqi
nuclear weapons projects lacked access to fissile material," it was
"advanced with regard to weapon design. '' t4 2 A recent report by
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace similarly con-
cluded that the threat to international peace and security posed
by Iraq lay not in stockpiles of unconventional weapons, but
rather in Iraq's "long-standing determination to acquire such
weapons, its scientific and technical resources... to make them,
and its demonstrated willingness to use [them]. ''"43 It is one
thing for the international community to judge States based on
their intentions and capabilities, 4 4 but quite another to con-
demn them with circumstantial evidence grounded on specula-
tion of what they might be capable of in the future. Shawcross
greatly understates the extent of the intelligence problem when
he argues that, although intelligence can be wrong, "it has to be
taken seriously when there is nothing else.' 4 5
This is where his argument disturbingly falls into the Minor-
Coalition during war, served as excuse for failure to find evidence of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq).
140. See SHAWCROSS, ALUES, supra note 5, at 190 (referring to Kay Interim Re-
port's findings that Hussein had been developing "clandestine network of laboratories
and facilities" designed to produce biological weapons).
141. See id. at 191-92 (arguing that Kay Interim Report provided definitive evi-
dence of Hussein's continued attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction).
142. See ROLF EKEus, U.S. DEP'T OF ST., IRAQ's REAL WEAPONS THREAT, available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/O3070223.htm (2003) (contending that evi-
dence of Hussein's intent to acquire WMD technology should have been enough to
justify war against Iraq).
143. JOSEPH CIRINCIONE ET AL., CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, 'WMD IN
IRAQ: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 47 (2004) (summarizing unclassified and declassified
findings of study on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq).
144. See SHAwCRoss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 70 (arguing that States should be
judged on their actions, intentions, and capabilities).
145. See id. at 151 (noting that many critics failed to realize corroboration of U.S.
and British intelligence by independent findings of other governments and organiza-
tions, including International Institute of Strategic Studies).
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ity Report 14 6 universe of totalitarian morality and preemptive ag-
gression advocated by certain neocon hard-liners. In a recent
panel discussion on the historical ramifications of the zeitgeist
that has empowered him, Richard Perle was unrepentant about
the CIA's intelligence failure leading up to the war: "The fact
that we have failed to unearth stockpiles [of WMDs]," said Perle,
"doesn't change the assessment that had to be made at the
time. '  Rooted in the belief that admitting fault only projects
weakness and invites more abuse, 148 the Bush administration's
reluctance to admit its intelligence failures in Iraq is indicative of
the neocon tendency to proceed as if all the events of the past
three years - the missing WMDs, the mounting post-war resis-
tance, the massive costs - have somehow vindicated their origi-
nal beliefs. 141
In his defense against some of the more malicious attacks
and "absurd caricatures" of neocon views,1 50 Shawcross either
fails to recognize, or does not discuss, the essential differences
between liberal internationalist thought and neoconservative
doctrine. Perhaps the distinction is not readily apparent: both
pro-war apologists and anti-war protesters lay claim to pragmatic
agendas in the sense that both advocate foreign policies tailored
to respond to what they perceive as the true terrorist threat after
September 11 th. Irving Kristol, the "godfather" of neoconservat-
ism, memorably defined a neocon as "a liberal who was mugged
by reality, 151 prompting M.I.T. economics professor Lester
146. See MINORiTY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002) (depicting future in which law
enforcement will develop means of stopping murders before they occur).
147. See Goldberg, supra note 46 (downplaying importance of faulty intelligence
for justifying war in Iraq).
148. See Bush Acknowledges Flawed Intel without Admitting Fault, DAILY NEWS, available
at http://www.tdn.com/articles (Feb. 2, 2004) (arguing that Bush's refusal to admit
fault is political tactic designed to generate uncertainty around failure to find weapons
of mass destruction and soften otherwise harsh public judgment).
149. See Goldberg, supra note 46 (describing Richard Perle's tendency to ignore
questions on whether neoconservatives contributed to faulty intelligence on Iraq).
150. See SHAWCROss, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 61-62 (arguing that misrepresentation
of neoconservative movement only inhibits helpful debate). William Pfaff writes of
their "fanatic" and "totalitarian morality," and the BBC had portrayed them as a sinister
cabal. Id. See also Michael Lind, How Neoconservatives Conquered Washington - and
Launched a War, at http://www.ilbolerodiravel.org/kattivi-maestri/lind-neoconserva-
tives.htm (Apr. 10, 2003) (describing neocon movement as product of "influential Jew-
ish-American sector of... Trotskyist movement"). But see Kamiya, supra note 13 (refer-
ring to neocon tendency to dismiss critics as anti-Semitic Bush-haters).
151. See Gary North, An Introduction to Neoconservatism, LewRockwell.com (June 10,
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Thurow to define a neo-liberal as "a liberal who was mugged by
reality, but who has declined to press charges. 1 52 It is a clever
aphorism that underscores the political schisms currently af-
flicting U.S. foreign policy.
While both neocons and liberals seek to improve the most
troubled places in the world, hard-liners want to do so by aggres-
sively installing democratic regimes that will be primarily
friendly to the United States and its allies; liberals want to facili-
tate the formation of democratic governments that will be pri-
marily friendly to their own people. 153 Neocons dismiss the
founding principles of the United Nations and advocate unre-
strained unilateral action whenever core interests are at stake; 154
liberals advocate the pursuit of UN authority and rely on the
multilateral mechanisms established by international law when-
ever possible. 155 Most importantly, neocons treat the invasion of
Iraq as "a divinely inspired crusade against evil which only a her-
etic could oppose;" 156 liberals view the war in Iraq as a distrac-
tion from the real war on terror. 57 This is the critical difference
between pro-war polemics like William Shawcross' Allies and self-
styled "manuals for victory" like Frum and Perle's An End to
Evil.'58 Ultimately, it is also where the battle lines will, no doubt,
be drawn as the United States struggles to reconstruct the devas-
tation of Hussein's deposed regime.
2003), at http://www.lewrockwell.com (discussing distinction between "paleoconserva-
tives" and "neoconservatives").
152. See North, supra note 151.
153. See Sanders, supra note 29, at F3 (discussing essential differences between ne-
oconservatives and liberals supporting war in Iraq). See also Liberal Hawks Reconsider the
Iraq War, Salon.com (Jan. 12, 2004), at http://slate.msn.com/id/2093620 (presenting
ongoing dialogue between prominent left-wing supporters of Iraq war on how their
attitudes have changed since U.S.-led invasion).
154. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 59 (discussing neocon arguments for
doctrine of qualified sovereignty).
155. See Charles A. Kupchan, Seeking Liberal Internationalism, BANGOR DAILY NEWS,
available at http://www.bangornews.com (Mar. 28, 2004) (tracing origins of liberal in-
ternationalism to President Franklin Roosevelt's effort to build bipartisan coalition be-
hind multilateralism in 1940's).
156. See Kamiya, supra note 13 (outlining differences between neocon and liberal
attitudes toward war in Iraq).
157. See generally RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: AMERICA'S WAR ON
TERROR (2004) (criticizing Bush's failure to deal effectively with Al Qaeda and global
terrorist threat prior to September 1 1th).




Implicating such serious issues as refugee migration, envi-
ronmental degradation, ethno-religious conflict, and WMD
proliferation, the "failed State" phenomenon is no longer simply
a regional problem. Insofar as fundamentalist dictators have
supported international terrorist efforts, the attack on the World
Trade Center offered a rude awakening to the grave and far-
reaching implications of social collapse in any given country.
159
A failed State used for decades as a "tool to serve [Hussein's]
cult of personality, ' 160 Iraq has since undergone devastation in
the orgy of looting that followed the Coalition victory.16 ' As U.S.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is quick to point out, a
degree of civil unrest is endemic to any situation in which for-
eign armies are forced to assume responsibility for the daily op-
eration of such troubled Nations as Afghanistan, Kosovo, Libe-
ria, and Somalia.1 62 What sets Iraq apart, among other things, is
the general lack of consensus as to how the occupying force
should now proceed. If the Coalition Provisional Authority
("CPA") 163 run by L. Paul Brenner is not a traditional military
occupation authority in terms of its broad and ambitious man-
date, it is also not a truly international effort with a clear strategy
for reconstruction.1 64 Shawcross admits as much when he argues
that, however much countries try to convince themselves that
159. See Phillip James Walker, Iraq, Failed States, and the Law of Occupation, 33(1)
INT'L L. NEWS 8 (2004) (discussing "failed State" phenomenon).
160. See Walker, supra note 159, at 8 (discussing potential sources of legal authority
for U.S.-led occupation of Iraq).
161. See Amnesty International, Iraq: Looting, Lawlessness and Humanitarian
Consequences (Aug. 5, 2003), at http://www.web.amnesty.org (calling on coalition
forces to take urgent measures to enforce law and order following military victory in
Iraq).
162. See Donald Rumsfeld, Speech before Council on Foreign Relations, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk (May 27, 2003) (arguing that degree of civil unrest is
endemic to all Nations undergoing transition from tyranny to freedom).
163. See Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA"), at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/
bremerbio.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2004) (describing Coalition Provisional Authority
as temporary governing body designated by United Nations as lawful government of
Iraq until such time as Iraq is sufficiently stable to assume sovereignty).
164. See Walker, supra note 159, at 1 (pointing out differences between occupation
of Iraq and previous humanitarian efforts in Kosovo and East Timor). See also Ted
Kennedy, On the Administration's Failure to Provide a Realistic, Specific Plan to Bring Stability
to Iraq, Common Dreams News Center (Oct. 16, 2003), at http://www.commondreams.
org/views03/1016-15.htm (criticizing Bush administration for failing to provide specific
plan for subsequent reconstruction effort in Iraq).
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Resolution 14831" "opens the way to peace which we must all
build together," the decision to give the United States and Brit-
ain absolute control until Iraq establishes its own government is
akin to endorsing Anglo-American hegemony in the country.1 6 6
Forcing democracy on societies traditionally schooled in re-
pression necessarily requires a precarious balancing between es-
tablishing popular sovereignty within prescribed deadlines and
meeting the onerous requirements of the constitutional process.
According to Middle East expert Fouad Ajami, "[a] political cul-
ture that averts its gaze from mass graves and works itself into
self-righteous hysteria over a foreign presence in an Arab coun-
try is a culture that has turned its back on political reason."167
Shawcross fails to address it in his book, but one wonders
whether a more competent leader than George W. Bush, per-
haps one with a greater degree of "political reason," might have
taken the time to better plan the peace as well as the war.
165. S.C. Res. 1483, UN SCOR, 4761 mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003) (provid-
ing legal backing for occupation of Iraq and officially ending thirteen-year period of
sanctions).
166. See SHAWCROSS, ALLIES, supra note 5, at 176-77 (stating that under Resolution
1483, United States and Great Britain have full control over Iraq's finances and are
permitted to implement immediate sale of Iraqi oil on world market). For an interest-
ing discussion of what has been called "the new imperialism," in which an occupying
force reaps economic benefits by dispossessing the property of occupied countries, see
Robert Chernomas, Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives, Once Again: What Was the
Real Motivation for War in Iraq?, Fast Facts (July 23, 2003), at http://www.policyalterna-
tives.ca/manitoba/fastfactsjuly23.html (discussing various ulterior motives for U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq).
167. See StAWCROSS, ALLIEs, supra note 5, at 224 (discussing need to balance return
of Iraqi sovereignty against creation of new administration capable of defending itself).
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